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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
The state appeals from the district court's order suppressing Tennison
Silver's statements made to law enforcement officers during a traffic stop.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
Police officer Jon Lenker stopped Silver's vehicle after observing Silver
both fail to stop at a stop sign and exceed the posted speed limit.
Tr., p.6, L.8 - p.7, L.14.)

(R., pp.71-72;

As Officer Lenker approached Silver's vehicle, he

smelled the odor of marijuana and observed Silver to be shaking. (R., p.72; Tr.,
p.9, L.22 - p.10, L.18.) In response to Officer Lenker's inquiry about the odor,
Silver responded that he hadn't smoked marijuana in several months, and that
the smell came from a friend of his whose house he had been at. (R., p.72; Tr.,
p.9, L.22 - p.10, L.5.)

Suspecting that Silver may be under the influence of

marijuana, Officer Lenker asked him to exit the vehicle so he could conduct
standard field sobriety tests. (R., p.72; Tr., p.11, L.22-p.12, L.1.)
As Officer Lenker began to explain and conduct the field sobriety tests,
Officer Kelly, who had arrived on scene, observed a baggie full of marijuana
sticking out of Silver's coat pocket in plain view. (R., p.72; Tr., Tr., p.29, L.19 p.30, L.10.) O"fficer Kelly took possession of the baggie. (R., p.72; P.30, Ls.1115.) Officer Lenker asked Silver again how long it had been since he smoked
marijuana, and Silver admitted it had been only thirty minutes.
p.30, Ls.16-21.)
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(R., p.72; Tr.,

Officer Lenker then asked Silver if he currently possessed any additional
contraband. (R., p.74.) Officer Lenker told Silver that if he was arrested, having
additional marijuana on his person could result in a separate criminal charge for
introducing contraband into the jail. (Id.; Tr., p.13, Ls.17-24.) Officer Kelly added
that with the marijuana evidence that had already been obtained, the officers
could "rip apart" and search Silver's car. (R., p.74; Tr., p.15, Ls.5-17; p.30, L.17
- p.31, L.8.) Silver then informed the officers that there was approximately one
ounce of marijuana in the front seat of the vehicle down on the floorboards. (R.,
pp.72, 74; Tr., p.16, Ls.5-9; p.31, Ls.9-14.) Officer Kelly retrieved the marijuana,
which was contained in smaller baggies within a larger baggie, from Silver's car.
(R., p.74; Tr., p.31, Ls.9-21.)

Recognizing that an ounce of marijuana was a significant amount for mere
personal use, Officer Lenker asked Silver whether he had planned to deliver the
marijuana to someone else. (Tr., p.16, Ls.12-21.)
delivering the marijuana to a friend.

Silver admitted that he was

(R., p.72; Tr., p.16, Ls.12-21.)

Officer

Lenker then told Silver that he had to complete the standard field sobriety tests
before deciding whether he was going to arrest Silver. (R., p. 78; state's exhibit
A, 7:46-7:52.) While the SFSTs were being conducted, Silver stated to Officer
1

Lenker "I'm going to jail no matter what aren t I?" (Tr., p.16, Ls.22-25; state's
1

1

exhibit A, 8:45-8:49.)

Officer Lenker replied that he still had to determine

whether Silver was under the influence of marijuana, but that he was "leaning"
towards arresting Silver because of the amount of marijuana he possessed and
his admission that he planned to deliver it. (State's exhibit A, 8:59-9: 11.) At this
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point, Silver referenced his uncle, who was a reserve police officer at the time.
(Tr., p.21, L.15 - p.22, L.3.) Officer Lenker told Silver that his uncle would be
disappointed if he lied to the police. (Id.)
After Silver failed to successfully complete the standard field sobriety tests
Officer Lenker placed him under arrest. (R., pp.72, 74-75; Tr., p.21, Ls.12-14;
state's exhibit A, 13:07-13:25.)

The state charged Silver with possession of

marijuana with intent to deliver and misdemeanor DUI, and the district court
consolidated these cases. (R., pp.39-40; 48-50; see also Idaho Data Repository,
Jerome County, Case No. CR 2011-07015.)
Silver filed a motion to suppress his statements made during the traffic
stop, asserting that the officers had engaged in a custodial interrogation of him
without first reciting Miranda 1 warnings.

(R., pp.55-61.)

After a hearing, the

district court suppressed all statements made by Silver after the marijuana was
found in his vehicle. (R., pp.71-86.) The state timely appealed. (R., p.87-90.)

1

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

3

ISSUE
Did the district court err in granting Silver's suppression motion?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred In Granting Silver's Suppression Motion

A.

Introduction
The district court suppressed statements

made by Silver to law

enforcement officers after concluding that the officers subjected Silver to
custodial interrogation without first reciting required Miranda warnings.
pp.71-86.)

(R.,

However, the district court's legal analysis was flawed because it

incorrectly focused on Silver's "reasonable belief' that he was going to be placed
under formal arrest at the conclusion of the traffic stop, as opposed to whether
Silver was actually in custody for Miranda purposes at the time he made
incriminating statements to the officers.

The district court therefore erred in

granting Silver's motion to suppress.

B.

Standard Of Review
The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a

decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, the appellate court accepts the
trial court's findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but freely
reviews the application of constitutional principles to those facts. State v. Klingler,
143 Idaho 494, 496, 148 P.3d 1240, 1242 (2006).

C.

The District Court Erred In Granting Silver's Suppression Motion
To safeguard the privilege against self-incrimination afforded by the Fifth

Amendment to the United States Constitution, the United States Supreme Court
held in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478-79 (1966), that before an individual
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is subjected to custodial interrogation, the interrogating officers must advise the
individual of certain rights, including the right to remain silent.

The test for

determining whether an individual is in custody for purposes of Miranda is
whether,

considering

the

totality

of the

circumstances

surrounding the

interrogation, there was a "formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement of
the degree associated with a formal arrest."

California v. Beheler, 463 U.S.

1121, 1125 (1983) (quoting Oregon v. Mathiason. 429 U.S. 492, 495 (1977)).
Because the "in custody" test for Miranda requires a restraint on freedom
associated with formal arrest, a person subjected to an investigative detention
based on reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, although not "free to leave," is
ordinarily not in custody for purposes of Miranda. See Berkemer v. McCarty, 468
U.S. 420 (1984); State v. Ybarra, 102 Idaho 573, 634 P.2d 435 (1981 ); see also
State v. Silva, 134 Idaho 848, 854, 11 P.3d 44, 50 (Ct. App. 2000). For example,
neither traffic stops nor the conducting of standard field sobriety tests
immediately invoke Miranda.

Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 440; State v. Pilik, 129

Idaho 50, 52, 921 P.2d 750, 752 (Ct. App. 1996).
The standard for determining when a suspect is in custody and Miranda
warnings are required does not depend on the subjective belief of the suspect or
officer. Rather, when applying this test, the relevant inquiry is how a reasonable
person in the suspect's position would have understood his situation. Berkemer,
468 U.S. at 442; State v. Doe, 137 Idaho 519, 523, 50 P.3d 1014, 1018 (2002);
State v. Albaugh, 133 Idaho 587, 591, 990 P .2d 753, 757 (Ct. App. 1999).
Specifically, the inquiry is "whether a reasonable person would believe he or she
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was in police custody to a degree associated with formal arrest, not whether the
person would believe he or she was not free to leave." Silva, 134 Idaho at 854,
11 P.3d at 50.
In determining whether an individual is in custody, the Court must consider
all of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation. Doe, 137 Idaho at 523, 50
P .3d at 1018. Relevant factors include the time, location, and public visibility of
the interrogation, the conduct of the officers, the nature and manner of the
questioning, and the presence of other persons. State v. Medrano, 123 Idaho
114, 117, 844 P.2d 1364, 1367 (Ct. App. 1992); Albaugh, 133 Idaho at 591, 990
P.2d at 757; Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 441-442. In State v. James, 148 Idaho 574,
577, 225 P.3d 1169, 1172 (2010), the Idaho Supreme Court held that the burden
of showing custody for the purposes of Miranda lies on the defendant.
In James, a police officer who conducted a traffic stop threatened to arrest
all of the occupants of the stopped vehicle unless someone admitted possession
of drugs and paraphernalia that were found in the car.

kl at 575-576,

225 P.3d

at 1169-1170. James then admitted ownership of the drugs and paraphernalia.

kl

James moved to suppress his confession, asserting that the officer's threat

constituted a custodial arrest for the purposes of Miranda.

kl:

The Idaho

Supreme Court affirmed the district court's denial of James' motion to suppress,
holding that "a conditional threat of future lawful arrest alone does not transform
detention into 'custody' for the purposes of Miranda."

kl: at 576-578,

225 P.3d at

1171-1173. The officer's statement of his intended future conduct could not be
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said to "objectively change the degree of restraint at the time of the statement."

kt at 578,

225 P.3d at 1173 (emphasis in original).

Similarly, in this case, Officer Lenker's threats and comments regarding
his potential future actions and the possibility of Silver's future formal arrest did
not change the degree of Silver's restraint, and they thus did not implicate
Miranda. In fact, Officer Lenker's threats and comments regarding the possibility
of Silver's arrest were much more indirect than the specific threat employed by
the officer in James.

Even after recovering the marijuana in Silver's vehicle,

Officer Lenker told Silver that he needed to complete the standard field sobriety
tests before he could make a decision whether to arrest Silver. {R., p.78; state's
exhibit A, 7:46-7:52.) When Silver initiated further discussion about his prospect
of future arrest, Officer Lenker told him merely that he was "leaning" towards
arresting Silver. (state's exhibit A, 8:59-9:11.)
Further, like in Smith, Officer Lenker's and Officer Kelly's statements about
their future potential actions each had legitimate bases in fact and the law.
Attempting to introduce marijuana into a correctional facility is a felony offense.
LC. § 18-2510(3).

The odor of marijuana coming from Silver's car, Silver's

admission that he had smoked marijuana thirty minutes prior to the traffic stop,
and the discovery of marijuana on Silver's person certainly gave the officers, as
Officer Kelly indicated to Silver, probable cause to search Silver's vehicle for
marijuana. See State v. Gallegos, 120 Idaho 894, 898, 821 P.2d 949, 953 (1991 ).
In addition, there is no evidence Silver was placed in handcuffs until his
formal arrest at the conclusion of the traffic stop, and his contact with the officers
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took place on the side of a public roadway. (Tr., p.6, L.8 - p.7, L.4.) Further, the
duration of Silver's contact with the officers was relatively brief.

Only

approximately thirteen minutes elapsed between Officer Lenker's initial contact
with Silver and Silver's formal arrest - a duration of time which included the
(State's exhibit A, O: 19 - 13:27.) Also,

conducting of the field sobriety tests.

there were only two police officers at the scene, and the tone of the officers
during their contact with Silver was not particularly hostile over overbearing.
(See generally, state's exhibit A.)
In granting Silver's motion to suppress, the district court concluded that
Silver was subject to formal custody for the purposes of Miranda by the time the
officers recovered the marijuana in his vehicle, and that the officers interrogated
Silver while he was in custody. 2 (R., pp.71-86.) While recognizing and quoting
from James, the district court failed to articulate how the present circumstances
were distinguishable and instead concluded:
However, [the officer's statement that Silver could be subject
to felony charges if he were arrested and had marijuana on his
person upon being booked into jail] implies that the defendant [was]
likely to be subject to arrest, as the defendant could not commit
introduction of contraband into a secure facility unless he was
booked into that facility. An additional factor is that Officer Kelly
threatening to rip or tear "his car apart" or Lenker's comment about
the defendant's uncle's reaction all contributed to a reasonable
belief that he was going to be placed under arrest.
(R., p.83.)

2

The district court analyzed the officers' questioning of Silver and found that it
constituted an interrogation for the purposes of Miranda. (R., pp.83-85.) The
state concedes that if Silver had been in custody for the purposes of Miranda,
than the officers' questioning of him would have implicated Miranda.
9

The district court's finding of reasonable belief in a future arrest does not
support a conclusion that Silver was in custody at the time he made the
statements at issue. While Silver was no doubt "subject to arrest" as soon as
marijuana was found on his person, and while he very well may have had "a
reasonable belief that he was going to placed under arrest," "[e]xpectation,
apprehension, or knowledge of inevitable arrest are not the Miranda triggers;
custody is." People v. Hankins, 201 P.3d 1215, 1219 (Colo. 2009).
The erroneous nature of the district court's focus on future arrest is best
illustrated by Idaho cases where courts relied on Berkemer in concluding that an
individual was not in custody (or the equivalent of formal arrest) where an
individual was being detained on a suspected DUI and where the investigating
officer required the suspect to take a field sobriety test that resulted in an arrest.
See State v. Benefiel, 131 Idaho 226, 229, 953 P.2d 976, 979 (1998); State v.
Pilik, 129 Idaho 50, 52, 921 P.2d 750, 752 (Ct. App. 1996); State v. Jones, 115
Idaho 1029, 1033, 772 P.2d 236, 240 (Ct. App.1989); Statev. Hartwig, 112 Idaho
370, 37 4, 732 P .2d 339, 343 (Ct. App. 1987).
In these cases, the court reasoned that the individual suspect was not in
custody. The court made this determination even though at the time the officer
requested the field sobriety test, the defendant likely knew that he would fail the
tests and ultimately be arrested. The focus in these cases was not, however, on
whether the defendants thought they would be arrested but, consistent with
Berkemer, whether the defendants were in custody.

In this case, the district

court did the opposite. Instead of focusing on the present status, whether Silver
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was in custody, the court focused on when a reasonable person in Silver's
position would have believed that he was "subject to arrest," and whether he "felt
free to leave" while performing field sobriety tests.

(R., p.85.)

Indeed, Silver,

who was driving under the influence, and had marijuana on his person and in his
vehicle, could reasonably have concluded he was soon "going to be placed
under arrest" from the moment he saw Officer Lenker's police vehicle's flashing
lights in his rear-view mirror. However, such a person is still not in "custody" for
the purposes of Miranda until that custody actually occurs. In this case, Silver
was not placed in custody for the purposes of Miranda until the conclusion of the
traffic stop.
The district court incorrectly focused on Silver's reasonable expectation of
future arrest in concluding that Silver was already subject to custodial arrest for
purposes of Miranda.

Reversal and remand for application of the correct

analysis is therefore appropriate.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to reverse the district court's
order suppressing evidence and remand for further proceedings.
DATED this 19th day of November, 2012.

MARK W. OLSON
Deputy Attorney General
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